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External Validity: From Do-Calculus to
Transportability Across Populations
Judea Pearl and Elias Bareinboim
Abstract. The generalizability of empirical findings to new environ-
ments, settings or populations, often called “external validity,” is es-
sential in most scientific explorations. This paper treats a particular
problem of generalizability, called “transportability,” defined as a li-
cense to transfer causal effects learned in experimental studies to a new
population, in which only observational studies can be conducted. We
introduce a formal representation called “selection diagrams” for ex-
pressing knowledge about differences and commonalities between pop-
ulations of interest and, using this representation, we reduce questions
of transportability to symbolic derivations in the do-calculus. This re-
duction yields graph-based procedures for deciding, prior to observing
any data, whether causal effects in the target population can be in-
ferred from experimental findings in the study population. When the
answer is affirmative, the procedures identify what experimental and
observational findings need be obtained from the two populations, and
how they can be combined to ensure bias-free transport.
Key words and phrases: Experimental design, generalizability, causal
effects, external validity.
1. INTRODUCTION: THREATS VS.
ASSUMPTIONS
Science is about generalization, and generalization
requires that conclusions obtained in the laboratory
be transported and applied elsewhere, in an envi-
ronment that differs in many aspects from that of
the laboratory.
Clearly, if the target environment is arbitrary,
or drastically different from the study environment
nothing can be transferred and scientific progress
will come to a standstill. However, the fact that
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most studies are conducted with the intention of ap-
plying the results elsewhere means that we usually
deem the target environment sufficiently similar to
the study environment to justify the transport of
experimental results or their ramifications.
Remarkably, the conditions that permit such
transport have not received systematic formal treat-
ment. In statistical practice, problems related to
combining and generalizing from diverse studies are
handled by methods of meta analysis (Glass (1976);
Hedges and Olkin (1985); Owen (2009)), or hierar-
chical models (Gelman and Hill (2007)), in which re-
sults of diverse studies are pooled together by stan-
dard statistical procedures (e.g., inverse-variance
reweighting in meta-analysis, partial pooling in hi-
erarchical modeling) and rarely make explicit dis-
tinction between experimental and observational
regimes; performance is evaluated primarily by sim-
ulation.
To supplement these methodologies, our paper
provides theoretical guidance in the form of limits on
what can be achieved in practice, what problems are
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likely to be encountered when populations differ sig-
nificantly from each other, what population differ-
ences can be circumvented by clever design and what
differences constitute theoretical impediments, pro-
hibiting generalization by any means whatsoever.
On the theoretical front, the standard literature
on this topic, falling under rubrics such as “exter-
nal validity” (Campbell and Stanley (1963), Man-
ski (2007)), “heterogeneity” (Ho¨fler, Gloster and
Hoyer (2010)), “quasi-experiments” (Shadish, Cook
and Campbell (2002), Chapter 3; Adelman (1991)),1
consists primarily of “threats,” namely, explanations
of what may go wrong when we try to transport re-
sults from one study to another while ignoring their
differences. Rarely do we find an analysis of “licens-
ing assumptions,” namely, formal conditions under
which the transport of results across differing envi-
ronments or populations is licensed from first prin-
ciples.2
The reasons for this asymmetry are several. First,
threats are safer to cite than assumptions. He
who cites “threats” appears prudent, cautious and
thoughtful, whereas he who seeks licensing assump-
tions risks suspicions of attempting to endorse those
assumptions.
Second, assumptions are self-destructive in their
honesty. The more explicit the assumption, the more
criticism it invites, for it tends to trigger a richer
space of alternative scenarios in which the assump-
tion may fail. Researchers prefer therefore to declare
threats in public and make assumptions in private.
Third, whereas threats can be communicated in
plain English, supported by anecdotal pointers to
familiar experiences, assumptions require a formal
1Manski (2007) defines “external validity” as follows: “An
experiment is said to have “external validity” if the distribu-
tion of outcomes realized by a treatment group is the same as
the distribution of outcome that would be realized in an ac-
tual program.” Campbell and Stanley (1963), page 5, take a
slightly broader view: ““External validity” asks the question
of generalizability: to what populations, settings, treatment
variables, and measurement variables can this effect be gen-
eralized?”
2Herna´n and VanderWeele (2011) studied such conditions
in the context of compound treatments, where we seek to
predict the effect of one version of a treatment from experi-
ments with a different version. Their analysis is a special case
of the theory developed in this paper (Petersen (2011)). A
related application is reported in Robins, Orellana and Rot-
nitzky (2008) where a treatment strategy is extrapolated be-
tween two biological similar populations under different ob-
servational regimes.
language within which the notion “environment” (or
“population”) is given precise characterization, and
differences among environments can be encoded and
analyzed.
The advent of causal diagrams (Wright (1921);
Heise (1975); Davis (1984); Verma and Pearl (1988);
Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993); Pearl (1995))
together with models of interventions (Haavelmo
(1943); Strotz and Wold (1960)) and counterfactu-
als (Neyman (1923); Rubin (1974); Robins (1986);
Balke and Pearl (1995)) provides such a language
and renders the formalization of transportability
possible.
Armed with this language, this paper departs
from the tradition of communicating “threats” and
embarks instead on the task of formulating “licenses
to transport,” namely, assumptions that, if they held
true, would permit us to transport results across
studies.
In addition, the paper uses the inferential ma-
chinery of the do-calculus (Pearl (1995); Koller and
Friedman (2009); Huang and Valtorta (2006); Sh-
pitser and Pearl (2006)) to derive algorithms for de-
ciding whether transportability is feasible and how
experimental and observational findings can be com-
bined to yield unbiased estimates of causal effects in
the target population.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we review the foundations of structural equations
modeling (SEM), the question of identifiability and
the do-calculus that emerges from these founda-
tions. (This section can be skipped by readers fa-
miliar with these concepts and tools.) In Section 3,
we motivate the question of transportability through
simple examples, and illustrate how the solution de-
pends on the causal story behind the problem. In
Section 4, we formally define the notion of trans-
portability and reduce it to a problem of symbolic
transformations in do-calculus. In Section 5, we pro-
vide a graphical criterion for deciding transporta-
bility and estimating transported causal effects. We
conclude in Section 6 with brief discussions of re-
lated problems of external validity, these include sta-
tistical transportability, and meta-analysis.
2. PRELIMINARIES: THE LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CAUSAL INFERENCE
The tools presented in this paper were developed
in the context of nonparametric Structural Equa-
tions Models (SEM), which is one among several
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approaches to causal inference, and goes back to
(Haavelmo (1943); Strotz and Wold (1960)). Other
approaches include, for example, potential-outcomes
(Rubin (1974)), Structured Tree Graphs (Robins
(1986)), decision analytic (Dawid (2002)), Causal
Bayesian Networks (Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines
(2000); Pearl (2000), Chapter 1; Bareinboim, Brito
and Pearl (2012)), and Settable Systems (White and
Chalak (2009)). We will first describe the generic
features common to all such approaches, and then
summarize how these features are represented in
SEM.3
2.1 Causal Models as Inference Engines
From a logical viewpoint, causal analysis relies on
causal assumptions that cannot be deduced from
(nonexperimental) data. Thus, every approach to
causal inference must provide a systematic way of
encoding, testing and combining these assumptions
with data. Accordingly, we view causal modeling as
an inference engine that takes three inputs and pro-
duces three outputs. The inputs are:
I-1. A set A of qualitative causal assumptions which
the investigator is prepared to defend on sci-
entific grounds, and a model MA that encodes
these assumptions mathematically. (In SEM,
MA takes the form of a diagram or a set of un-
specified functions. A typical assumption is that
no direct effect exists between a pair of vari-
ables (known as exclusion restriction), or that
an omitted factor, represented by an error term,
is independent of other such factors observed or
unobserved, known as well as unknown.
I-2. A set Q of queries concerning causal or coun-
terfactual relationships among variables of in-
terest. In linear SEM, Q concerned the magni-
tudes of structural coefficients but, in general,
Q may address causal relations directly, for ex-
ample:
Q1: What is the effect of treatment X on out-
come Y ?
Q2: Is this employer practicing gender discrim-
ination?
3 We use the acronym SEM for both parametric and non-
parametric representations though, historically, SEM practi-
tioners preferred the former (Bollen and Pearl (2013)). Pearl
(2011) has used the term Structural Causal Models (SCM)
to eliminate this confusion. While comparisons of the various
approaches lie beyond the scope of this paper, we nevertheless
propose that their merits be judged by the extent to which
each facilitates the functions described below.
In principle, each query Qi ∈Q should be “well
defined,” that is, computable from any fully
specified modelM compatible with A. (See Def-
inition 1 for formal characterization of a model,
and also Section 2.4 for the problem of identifi-
cation in partially specified models.)
I-3. A set D of experimental or non-experimental
data, governed by a joint probability distribu-
tion presumably consistent with A.
The outputs are:
O-1. A set A∗ of statements which are the logical
implications of A, separate from the data at
hand. For example, thatX has no effect on Y if
we hold Z constant, or that Z is an instrument
relative to {X , Y }.
O-2. A set C of data-dependent claims concern-
ing the magnitudes or likelihoods of the tar-
get queries in Q, each contingent on A. C may
contain, for example, the estimated mean and
variance of a given structural parameter, or the
expected effect of a given intervention. Auxil-
iary to C, a causal model should also yield an
estimand Qi(P ) for each query in Q, or a de-
termination that Qi is not identifiable from P
(Definition 2).
O-3. A list T of testable statistical implications
of A (which may or may not be part of O-
2), and the degree g(Ti), Ti ∈ T , to which the
data agrees with each of those implications.
A typical implication would be a conditional
independence assertion, or an equality con-
straint between two probabilistic expressions.
Testable constraints should be read from the
model MA (see Definition 3), and used to con-
firm or disconfirm the model against the data.
The structure of this inferential exercise is shown
schematically in Figure 1. For a comprehensive re-
view on methodological issues, see Pearl (2009a,
2012a).
2.2 Assumptions in Nonparametric Models
A structural equation model (SEM) M is defined
as follows.
Definition 1 (Structural equation model (Pearl
(2000), page 203)).
1. A set U of background or exogenous variables,
representing factors outside the model, which
nevertheless affect relationships within the model.
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Fig. 1. Causal analysis depicted as an inference engine converting assumptions (A), queries (Q), and data (D) into logical
implications (A∗), conditional claims (C), and data-fitness indices (g(T )).
2. A set V = {V1, . . . , Vn} of endogenous variables,
assumed to be observable. Each of these variables
is functionally dependent on some subset PAi of
U ∪ V .
3. A set F of functions {f1, . . . , fn} such that each
fi determines the value of Vi ∈ V , vi = fi(pai, u).
4. A joint probability distribution P (u) over U .
A simple SEM model is depicted in Figure 2(a),
which represents the following three functions:
z = fZ(uZ),
x= fX(z,uX),(2.1)
y = fY (x,uY ),
where in this particular example, UZ , UX and UY
are assumed to be jointly independent but otherwise
arbitrarily distributed. Whenever dependence exists
between any two exogenous variables, a bidirected
arrow will be added to the diagram to represent this
dependence (e.g., Figure 4).4 Each of these functions
Fig. 2. The diagrams associated with (a) the structural
model of equation (2.1) and (b) the modified model of equation
(2.2), representing the intervention do(X = x0).
4More precisely, the absence of bidirected arrows implies
marginal independences relative of the respective exogenous
represents a causal process (or mechanism) that de-
termines the value of the left variable (output) from
the values on the right variables (inputs), and is as-
sumed to be invariant unless explicitly intervened
on. The absence of a variable from the right-hand
side of an equation encodes the assumption that na-
ture ignores that variable in the process of determin-
ing the value of the output variable. For example,
the absence of variable Z from the arguments of fY
conveys the empirical claim that variations in Z will
leave Y unchanged, as long as variables UY and X
remain constant.
It is important to distinguish between a fully spec-
ified model in which P (U) and the collection of func-
tions F are specified and a partially specified model,
usually in the form of a diagram. The former entails
one and only one observational distribution P (V );
the latter entails a set of observational distributions
P (V ) that are compatible with the graph (those that
can be generated by specifying 〈F,P (u)〉).
2.3 Representing Interventions, Counterfactuals
and Causal Effects
This feature of invariance permits us to derive
powerful claims about causal effects and counter-
factuals, even in nonparametric models, where all
functions and distributions remain unknown. This is
done through a mathematical operator called do(x),
which simulates physical interventions by deleting
certain functions from the model, replacing them
variables. In other words, the set of all bidirected edges con-
stitute an i-map of P (U) (Richardson (2003)).
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with a constant X = x, while keeping the rest of
the model unchanged (Haavelmo (1943); Strotz and
Wold (1960); Pearl (2014)). For example, to emulate
an intervention do(x0) that sets X to a constant x0
in model M of Figure 2(a), the equation for x in
equation (2.1) is replaced by x= x0, and we obtain
a new model, Mx0 ,
z = fZ(uZ),
x= x0,(2.2)
y = fY (x,uY ),
the graphical description of which is shown in Fig-
ure 2(b).
The joint distribution associated with this mod-
ified model, denoted P (z, y|do(x0)) describes the
post-intervention distribution of variables Y and
Z (also called “controlled” or “experimental” dis-
tribution), to be distinguished from the preinter-
vention distribution, P (x, y, z), associated with the
original model of equation (2.1). For example, if
X represents a treatment variable, Y a response
variable, and Z some covariate that affects the
amount of treatment received, then the distribution
P (z, y|do(x0)) gives the proportion of individuals
that would attain response level Y = y and covari-
ate level Z = z under the hypothetical situation in
which treatment X = x0 is administered uniformly
to the population.5
In general, we can formally define the postinter-
vention distribution by the equation
PM (y|do(x)) = PMx(y).(2.3)
In words, in the framework of model M , the postin-
tervention distribution of outcome Y is defined as
the probability that model Mx assigns to each out-
come level Y = y. From this distribution, which is
readily computed from any fully specified modelM ,
we are able to assess treatment efficacy by compar-
ing aspects of this distribution at different levels
of x0.
6
5Equivalently, P (z, y|do(x0)) can be interpreted as the
joint probability of (Z = z,Y = y) under a randomized ex-
periment among units receiving treatment level X = x0.
Readers versed in potential-outcome notations may interpret
P (y|do(x), z) as the probability P (Yx = y|Zx = z), where Yx
is the potential outcome under treatment X = x.
6Counterfactuals are defined similarly through the equation
Yx(u) = YMx(u) (see Pearl (2009b), Chapter 7), but will not
be needed for the discussions in this paper.
2.4 Identification, d-Separation and Causal
Calculus
A central question in causal analysis is the ques-
tion of identification of causal queries (e.g., the effect
of intervention do(X = x0)) from a combination of
data and a partially specified model, for example,
when only the graph is given and neither the func-
tions F nor the distribution of U . In linear paramet-
ric settings, the question of identification reduces
to asking whether some model parameter, β, has a
unique solution in terms of the parameters of P (say
the population covariance matrix). In the nonpara-
metric formulation, the notion of “has a unique so-
lution” does not directly apply since quantities such
as Q(M) = P (y|do(x)) have no parametric signa-
ture and are defined procedurally by simulating an
intervention in a causal model M , as in equation
(2.2). The following definition captures the require-
ment that Q be estimable from the data:
Definition 2 (Identifiability). A causal query
Q(M) is identifiable, given a set of assumptions A,
if for any two (fully specified) models, M1 and M2,
that satisfy A, we have 7
P (M1) = P (M2)⇒Q(M1) =Q(M2).(2.4)
In words, the functional details of M1 and M2 do
not matter; what matters is that the assumptions
in A (e.g., those encoded in the diagram) would
constrain the variability of those details in such a
way that equality of P ’s would entail equality of
Q’s. When this happens, Q depends on P only, and
should therefore be expressible in terms of the pa-
rameters of P .
When a query Q is given in the form of a do-
expression, for example, Q= P (y|do(x), z), its iden-
tifiability can be decided systematically using an al-
gebraic procedure known as the do-calculus (Pearl
(1995)). It consists of three inference rules that per-
mit us to map interventional and observational dis-
tributions whenever certain conditions hold in the
causal diagram G.
The conditions that permit the application these
inference rules can be read off the diagrams using
7An implication similar to (2.4) is used in the standard
statistical definition of parameter identification, where it con-
veys the uniqueness of a parameter set θ given a distribution
Pθ (Lehmann and Casella (1998)). To see the connection, one
should think about the query Q = P (y|do(x)) as a function
Q = g(θ) where θ is the pair F ∪ P (u) that characterizes a
fully specified model M .
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a graphical criterion known as d-separation (Pearl
(1988)).
Definition 3 (d-separation). A set S of nodes
is said to block a path p if either
1. p contains at least one arrow-emitting node that
is in S, or
2. p contains at least one collision node that is out-
side S and has no descendant in S.
If S blocks all paths from set X to set Y , it is said to
“d-separate X and Y ,” and then, it can be shown
that variables X and Y are independent given S,
written X⊥ Y |S.8
D-separation reflects conditional independencies
that hold in any distribution P (v) that is compatible
with the causal assumptions A embedded in the di-
agram. To illustrate, the path UZ →Z→X→ Y in
Figure 2(a) is blocked by S = {Z} and by S = {X},
since each emits an arrow along that path. Conse-
quently, we can infer that the conditional indepen-
dencies UZ⊥ Y |Z and UZ⊥ Y |X will be satisfied in
any probability function that this model can gener-
ate, regardless of how we parameterize the arrows.
Likewise, the path UZ →Z→X← UX is blocked by
the null set {∅}, but it is not blocked by S = {Y }
since Y is a descendant of the collision node X . Con-
sequently, the marginal independence UZ⊥ UX will
hold in the distribution, but UZ⊥ UX |Y may or may
not hold.9
2.5 The Rules of do-Calculus
Let X , Y , Z and W be arbitrary disjoint sets
of nodes in a causal DAG G. We denote by G
X
the graph obtained by deleting from G all arrows
pointing to nodes in X . Likewise, we denote by GX
the graph obtained by deleting from G all arrows
emerging from nodes in X . To represent the deletion
of both incoming and outgoing arrows, we use the
notation G
XZ
.
The following three rules are valid for every inter-
ventional distribution compatible with G:
8See Hayduk et al. (2003), Glymour and Greenland (2008)
and Pearl (2009b), page 335, for a gentle introduction to d-
separation.
9This special handling of collision nodes (or colliders, e.g.,
Z→X← UX ) reflects a general phenomenon known as Berk-
son’s paradox (Berkson (1946)), whereby observations on a
common consequence of two independent causes render those
causes dependent. For example, the outcomes of two indepen-
dent coins are rendered dependent by the testimony that at
least one of them is a tail.
Rule 1 (Insertion/deletion of observations).
P (y|do(x), z,w)
(2.5)
= P (y|do(x),w) if (Y⊥ Z|X,W )G
X
.
Rule 2 (Action/observation exchange).
P (y|do(x),do(z),w)
(2.6)
= P (y|do(x), z,w) if (Y⊥ Z|X,W )G
XZ
.
Rule 3 (Insertion/deletion of actions).
P (y|do(x),do(z),w)
(2.7)
= P (y|do(x),w) if (Y⊥ Z|X,W )G
XZ(W )
,
where Z(W ) is the set of Z-nodes that are not an-
cestors of any W -node in G
X
.
To establish identifiability of a query Q, one needs
to repeatedly apply the rules of do-calculus to Q,
until the final expression no longer contains a do-
operator;10 this renders it estimable from nonexper-
imental data. The do-calculus was proven to be com-
plete for the identifiability of causal effects in the
form Q= P (y|do(x), z) (Shpitser and Pearl (2006);
Huang and Valtorta (2006)), which means that if Q
cannot be expressed in terms of the probability of
observables P by repeated application of these three
rules, such an expression does not exist. In other
words, the query is not estimable from observational
studies without making further assumptions, for ex-
ample, linearity, monotonicity, additivity, absence of
interactions, etc.
We shall see that, to establish transportability,
the goal will be different; instead of eliminating do-
operators from the query expression, we will need to
separate them from a set of variables S that repre-
sent disparities between populations.
3. INFERENCE ACROSS POPULATIONS:
MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
To motivate the treatment of Section 4, we first
demonstrate some of the subtle questions that trans-
portability entails through three simple examples,
informally depicted in Figure 3.
Example 1. Consider the graph in Figure 3(a)
that represents cause-effect relationships in the pre-
treatment population in Los Angeles. We conduct
10Such derivations are illustrated in graphical details in
Pearl (2009b), page 87.
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Fig. 3. Causal diagrams depicting Examples 1–3. In (a) Z represents “age.” In (b), Z represents “linguistic skills” while age
(in hollow circle) is unmeasured. In (c), Z represents a biological marker situated between the treatment (X) and a disease (Y ).
a randomized trial in Los Angeles and estimate the
causal effect of exposure X on outcome Y for every
age group Z = z.11,12 We now wish to generalize the
results to the population of New York City (NYC),
but data alert us to the fact that the study distribu-
tion P (x, y, z) in LA is significantly different from
the one in NYC (call the latter P ∗(x, y, z)). In par-
ticular, we notice that the average age in NYC is
significantly higher than that in LA. How are we
to estimate the causal effect of X on Y in NYC,
denoted P ∗(y|do(x))?
Our natural inclination would be to assume that
age-specific effects are invariant across cities and so,
if the LA study provides us with (estimates of) age-
specific causal effects P (y|do(x),Z = z), the overall
causal effect in NYC should be
P ∗(y|do(x)) =
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)P ∗(z).(3.1)
This transport formula combines experimental re-
sults obtained in LA, P (y|do(x), z), with observa-
tional aspects of NYC population, P ∗(z), to obtain
an experimental claim P ∗(y|do(x)) about NYC.13
Our first task in this paper will be to explicate the
assumptions that renders this extrapolation valid.
11Throughout the paper, each graph represents the causal
structure of the population prior to the treatment, hence X
stands for the level of treatment taken by an individual out
of free choice.
12The arrow from Z to X represents the tendency of older
people to seek treatment more often than younger people,
and the arrow from Z to Y represents the effect of age on the
outcome.
13At first glance, equation (3.1) may be regarded as a rou-
tine application of “standardization” or “recalibration”—a
statistical extrapolation method that can be traced back to a
century-old tradition in demography and political arithmetic
(Westergaard (1916); Yule (1934); Lane and Nelder (1982)).
On a second thought, it raises the deeper question of why we
consider age-specific effects to be invariant across populations.
See discussion following Example 2.
We ask, for example, what must we assume about
other confounding variables beside age, both latent
and observed, for equation (3.1) to be valid, or,
would the same transport formula hold if Z was
not age, but some proxy for age, say, language pro-
ficiency. More intricate yet, what if Z stood for
an exposure-dependent variable, say hyper-tension
level, that stands between X and Y ?
Let us examine the proxy issue first.
Example 2. Let the variable Z in Example 1
stand for subjects language proficiency, and let us
assume that Z does not affect exposure (X) or
outcome (Y ), yet it correlates with both, being
a proxy for age which is not measured in either
study [see Figure 3(b)]. Given the observed dispar-
ity P (z) 6= P ∗(z), how are we to estimate the causal
effect P ∗(y|do(x)) for the target population of NYC
from the z-specific causal effect P (y|do(x), z) esti-
mated at the study population of LA?
The inequality P (z) 6= P ∗(z) in this example may
reflect either age difference or differences in the way
that Z correlates with age. If the two cities enjoy
identical age distributions and NYC residents ac-
quire linguistic skills at a younger age, then since Z
has no effect whatsoever on X and Y , the inequal-
ity P (z) 6= P ∗(z) can be ignored and, intuitively, the
proper transport formula would be
P ∗(y|do(x)) = P (y|do(x)).(3.2)
If, on the other hand, the conditional probabilities
P (z|age) and P ∗(z|age) are the same in both cities,
and the inequality P (z) 6= P ∗(z) reflects genuine age
differences, equation (3.2) is no longer valid, since
the age difference may be a critical factor in deter-
mining how people react to X . We see, therefore,
that the choice of the proper transport formula de-
pends on the causal context in which population dif-
ferences are embedded.
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This example also demonstrates why the invari-
ance of Z-specific causal effects should not be taken
for granted. While justified in Example 1, with Z =
age, it fails in Example 2, in which Z was equated
with “language skills.” Indeed, using Figure 3(b) for
guidance, the Z-specific effect of X on Y in NYC is
given by
P ∗(y|do(x), z)
=
∑
age
P ∗(y|do(x), z,age)P ∗(age|do(x), z)
=
∑
age
P ∗(y|do(x),age)P ∗(age|z)
=
∑
age
P (y|do(x),age)P ∗(age|z).
Thus, if the two populations differ in the relation
between age and skill, that is,
P (age|z) 6= P ∗(age|z)
the skill-specific causal effect would differ as well.
The intuition is clear. A NYC person at skill level
Z = z is likely to be in a totally different age group
from his skill-equals in Los Angeles and, since it is
age, not skill that shapes the way individuals re-
spond to treatment, it is only reasonable that Los
Angeles residents would respond differently to treat-
ment than their NYC counterparts at the very same
skill level.
The essential difference between Examples 1 and
2 is that age is normally taken to be an exoge-
nous variable (not assigned by other factors in the
model) while skills may be indicative of earlier fac-
tors (age, education, ethnicity) capable of modifying
the causal effect. Therefore, conditional on skill, the
effect may be different in the two populations.
Example 3. Examine the case where Z is a
X-dependent variable, say a disease bio-marker,
standing on the causal pathways between X and Y
as shown in Figure 3(c). Assume further that the
disparity P (z|x) 6= P ∗(z|x) is discovered and that,
again, both the average and the z-specific causal ef-
fect P (y|do(x), z) are estimated in the LA experi-
ment, for all levels of X and Z. Can we, based on in-
formation given, estimate the average (or z-specific)
causal effect in the target population of NYC?
Here, equation (3.1) is wrong because the overall
causal effect (in both LA and NYC) is no longer a
simple average of the z-specific causal effects. The
correct weighing rule is
P ∗(y|do(x))
(3.3)
=
∑
z
P ∗(y|do(x), z)P ∗(z|do(x)),
which reduces to (3.1) only in the special case where
Z is unaffected by X . Equation (3.2) is also wrong
because we can no longer argue, as we did in Exam-
ple 2, that Z does not affect Y , hence it can be ig-
nored. Here, Z lies on the causal pathway betweenX
and Y so, clearly, it affects their relationship. What
then is the correct transport formula for this sce-
nario?
To cast this example in a more realistic setting, let
us assume that we wish to use Z as a “surrogate end-
point” to predict the efficacy of treatment X on out-
come Y , where Y is too difficult and/or expensive to
measure routinely (Prentice (1989); Ellenberg and
Hamilton (1989)). Thus, instead of considering ex-
perimental and observational studies conducted at
two different locations, we consider two such studies
taking place at the same location, but at different
times. In the first study, we measure P (y, z|do(x))
and discover that Z is a good surrogate, namely,
knowing the effect of treatment on Z allows predic-
tion of the effect of treatment on the more clinically
relevant outcome (Y ) (Joffe and Greene (2009)).
Once Z is proclaimed a “surrogate endpoint,” it in-
vites efforts to find direct means of controlling Z.
For example, if cholesterol level is found to be a pre-
dictor of heart diseases in a long-run trial, drug man-
ufacturers would rush to offer cholesterol-reducing
substances for public consumption. As a result, both
the prior P (z) and the treatment-dependent proba-
bility P (z|do(x)) would undergo a change, resulting
in P ∗(z) and P ∗(z|do(x)), respectively.
We now wish to reassess the effect of the drug
P ∗(y|do(x)) in the new population and do it in the
cheapest possible way, namely, by conducting an ob-
servational study to estimate P ∗(z,x), acknowledg-
ing that confounding exists between X and Y and
that the drug affects Y both directly and through
Z, as shown in Figure 3(c).
Using a graphical representation to encode the as-
sumptions articulated thus far, and further assum-
ing that the disparity observed stems only from a
difference in people’s susceptibility to X (and not
due to a change in some unobservable confounder),
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we will prove in Section 5 that the correct transport
formula should be
P ∗(y|do(x)) =
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)P ∗(z|x),(3.4)
which is different from both (3.1) and (3.2). It calls
instead for the z-specific effects to be reweighted by
the conditional probability P ∗(z|x), estimated in the
target population.14
To see how the transportability problem fits into
the general scheme of causal analysis discussed in
Section 2.1 (Figure 1), we note that, in our case, the
data comes from two sources, experimental (from
the study) and nonexperimental (from the target),
assumptions are encoded in the form of selection di-
agrams, and the query stands for the causal effect
(e.g., P ∗(y|do(x))). Although this paper does not
discuss the goodness-of-fit problem, standard meth-
ods are available for testing the compatibility of the
selection diagram with the data available.
4. FORMALIZING TRANSPORTABILITY
4.1 Selection Diagrams and Selection Variables
The pattern that emerges from the examples dis-
cussed in Section 3 indicates that transportability
is a causal, not statistical notion. In other words,
the conditions that license transport as well as the
formulas through which results are transported de-
pend on the causal relations between the variables
in the domain, not merely on their statistics. For
instance, it was important in Example 3 to as-
certain that the change in P (z|x) was due to the
change in the way Z is affected by X , but not due
to a change in confounding conditions between the
two. This cannot be determined solely by compar-
ing P (z|x) and P ∗(z|x). If X and Z are confounded
[e.g., Figure 6(e)], it is quite possible for the in-
equality P (z|x) 6= P ∗(z|x) to hold, reflecting differ-
ences in confounding, while the way that Z is af-
fected by X (i.e., P (z|do(x))) is the same in the
two populations—a different transport formula will
then emerge for this case.
Consequently, licensing transportability requires
knowledge of the mechanisms, or processes, through
14Quite often the possibility of running a second random-
ized experiment to estimate P ∗(z|do(x)) is also available to
investigators, though at a higher cost. In such cases, a trans-
port formula would be derivable under more relaxed assump-
tions, for example, allowing for X and Z to be confounded.
which population differences come about; differ-
ent localization of these mechanisms yield different
transport formulae. This can be seen most vividly in
Example 2 [Figure 3(b)] where we reasoned that no
reweighing is necessary if the disparity P (z) 6= P ∗(z)
originates with the way language proficiency de-
pends on age, while the age distribution itself re-
mains the same. Yet, because age is not measured,
this condition cannot be detected in the probability
distribution P , and cannot be distinguished from an
alternative condition,
P (age) 6= P ∗(age) and P (z|age) = P ∗(z|age),
one that may require reweighting according to equa-
tion (3.1). In other words, every probability distri-
bution P (x, y, z) that is compatible with the process
of Figure 3(b) is also compatible with that of Fig-
ure 3(a) and, yet, the two processes dictate different
transport formulas.
Based on these observations, it is clear that if we
are to represent formally the differences between
populations (similarly, between experimental set-
tings or environments), we must resort to a represen-
tation in which the causal mechanisms are explicitly
encoded and in which differences in populations are
represented as local modifications of those mecha-
nisms.
To this end, we will use causal diagrams aug-
mented with a set, S, of “selection variables,” where
each member of S corresponds to a mechanism by
which the two populations differ, and switching be-
tween the two populations will be represented by
conditioning on different values of these S vari-
ables.15
Intuitively, if P (v|do(x)) stands for the distribu-
tion of a set V of variables in the experimental
study (with X randomized) then we designate by
P ∗(v|do(x)) the distribution of V if we were to con-
duct the study on population Π∗ instead of Π. We
now attribute the difference between the two to the
15Disparities among populations or subpopulations can also
arise from differences in design; for example, if two samples are
drawn by different criteria from a given population. The prob-
lem of generalizing between two such subpopulations is usu-
ally called sampling selection bias (Heckman (1979); Herna´n,
Herna´ndez-Dı´az and Robins (2004); Cole and Stuart (2010);
Pearl (2013); Bareinboim, Tian and Pearl (2014)). In this pa-
per, we deal only with nature-induced, not man-made dispar-
ities.
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Fig. 4. Selection diagrams depicting specific versions of Examples 1–3. In (a), the two populations differ in age distributions.
In (b), the populations differs in how Z depends on age (an unmeasured variable, represented by the hollow circle) and the
age distributions are the same. In (c), the populations differ in how Z depends on X. In all diagrams, dashed arcs (e.g.,
X L9999K Y ) represent the presence of latent variables affecting both X and Y .
action of a set S of selection variables, and write16,17
P ∗(v|do(x)) = P (v|do(x), s∗).
The selection variables in S may represent all fac-
tors by which populations may differ or that may
“threaten” the transport of conclusions between
populations. For example, in Figure 4(a) the age dis-
parity P (z) 6= P ∗(z) discussed in Example 1 will be
represented by the inequality
P (z) 6= P (z|s),
where S stands for all factors responsible for draw-
ing subjects at age Z = z to NYC rather than LA.
Of equal importance is the absence of an S vari-
able pointing to Y in Figure 4(a), which encodes
the assumption that age-specific effects are invari-
ant across the two populations.
This graphical representation, which we will call
“selection diagrams” is defined as follows:18
16Alternatively, one can represent the two populations’ dis-
tributions by P (v|do(x), s), and P (v|do(x), s∗), respectively.
The results, however, will be the same, since only the location
of S enters the analysis.
17Pearl (1993, 2009b, page 71), Spirtes, Glymour and
Scheines (1993) and Dawid (2002), for example, use condi-
tioning on auxiliary variables to switch between experimen-
tal and observational studies. Dawid (2002) further uses such
variables to represent changes in parameters of probability
distributions.
18The assumption that there are no structural changes be-
tween domains can be relaxed starting with D = G∗ and
adding S-nodes following the same procedure as in Defini-
tion 4, while enforcing acyclicity. In extreme cases in which
the two domains differ in causal directionality (Spirtes, Gly-
mour and Scheines (2000), pages 298–299), acyclicity cannot
be maintained. This complication as well as one created when
G is a edge-super set of G∗ require a more elaborated graph-
ical representation and lie beyond the scope of this paper.
Definition 4 (Selection diagram). Let 〈M,M∗〉
be a pair of structural causal models (Definition 1)
relative to domains 〈Π,Π∗〉, sharing a causal dia-
gram G. 〈M,M∗〉 is said to induce a selection dia-
gram D if D is constructed as follows:
1. Every edge in G is also an edge in D.
2. D contains an extra edge Si → Vi whenever there
might exist a discrepancy fi 6= f
∗
i
or P (Ui) 6=
P ∗(Ui) between M and M
∗.
In summary, the S-variables locate the mecha-
nisms where structural discrepancies between the
two populations are suspected to take place. Alter-
natively, the absence of a selection node pointing to
a variable represents the assumption that the mech-
anism responsible for assigning value to that vari-
able is the same in the two populations. In the ex-
treme case, we could add selection nodes to all vari-
ables, which means that we have no reason to be-
lieve that the populations share any mechanism in
common, and this, of course would inhibit any ex-
change of information among the populations. The
invariance assumptions between populations, as we
will see, will open the door for the transport of some
experimental findings.
For clarity, we will represent the S variables by
squares, as in Figure 4, which uses selection dia-
grams to encode the three examples discussed in
Section 3. (Besides the S variables, these graphs
also include additional latent variables, represented
by bidirected edges, which makes the examples more
realistic.) In particular, Figures 4(a) and 4(b) repre-
sent, respectively, two different mechanisms respon-
sible for the observed disparity P (z) 6= P ∗(z). The
first [Figure 4(a)] dictates transport formula (3.1),
while the second [Figure 4(b)] calls for direct, un-
adjusted transport (3.2). This difference stems from
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the location of the S variables in the two diagrams.
In Figure 4(a), the S variable represents unspecified
factors that cause age differences between the two
populations, while in Figure 4(b), S represents fac-
tors that cause differences in reading skills (Z) while
the age distribution itself (unobserved) remains the
same.
In this paper, we will address the issue of trans-
portability assuming that scientific knowledge about
invariance of certain mechanisms is available and
encoded in the selection diagram through the S
nodes. Such knowledge is, admittedly, more de-
manding than that which shapes the structure of
each causal diagram in isolation. It is, however, a
prerequisite for any attempt to justify transfer of
findings across populations, which makes selection
diagrams a mathematical object worthy of analysis.
4.2 Transportability: Definitions and Examples
Using selection diagrams as the basic represen-
tational language, and harnessing the concepts of
intervention, do-calculus, and identifiability (Sec-
tion 2), we can now give the notion of transporta-
bility a formal definition.
Definition 5 (Transportability). Let D be a
selection diagram relative to domains 〈Π,Π∗〉. Let
〈P, I〉 be the pair of observational and interventional
distributions of Π, and P ∗ be the observational
distribution of Π∗. The causal relation R(Π∗) =
P ∗(y|do(x), z) is said to be transportable from Π
to Π∗ in D if R(Π∗) is uniquely computable from
P,P ∗, I in any model that induces D.
Two interesting connections between identifiabil-
ity and transportability are worth noting. First, note
that all identifiable causal relations in D are also
transportable, because they can be computed di-
rectly from P ∗ and require no experimental informa-
tion from Π. Second, note that given causal diagram
G, one can produce a selection diagram D such that
identifiability in G is equivalent to transportability
in D. First set D =G, and then add selection nodes
pointing to all variables in D, which represents that
the target domain does not share any mechanism
with its counterpart—this is equivalent to the prob-
lem of identifiability because the only way to achieve
transportability is to identify R from scratch in the
target population.
While the problems of identifiability and trans-
portability are related, proofs of nontransportability
are more involved than those of nonidentifiability for
they require one to demonstrate the nonexistence of
two competing models compatible with D, agreeing
on {P,P ∗, I}, and disagreeing on R(Π∗).
Definition 5 is declarative, and does not offer
an effective method of demonstrating transportabil-
ity even in simple models. Theorem 1 offers such
a method using a sequence of derivations in do-
calculus.
Theorem 1. Let D be the selection diagram
characterizing two populations, Π and Π∗, and S
a set of selection variables in D. The relation R
= P ∗(y|do(x), z) is transportable from Π to Π∗ if
the expression P (y|do(x), z, s) is reducible, using the
rules of do-calculus, to an expression in which S
appears only as a conditioning variable in do-free
terms.
Proof. Every relation satisfying the condition
of Theorem 1 can be written as an algebraic com-
bination of two kinds of terms, those that involve
S and those that do not. The former can be writ-
ten as P ∗-terms and are estimable, therefore, from
observations on Π∗, as required by Definition 5. All
other terms, especially those involving do-operators,
do not contain S; they are experimentally identifi-
able therefore in Π. 
This criterion was proven to be both sufficient and
necessary for causal effects, namely R= P ∗(y|do(x))
(Bareinboim and Pearl (2012)). Theorem 1, though
procedural, does not specify the sequence of rules
leading to the needed reduction when such a se-
quence exists. Bareinboim and Pearl (2013b) de-
rived a complete procedural solution for this, based
on graphical method developed in (Tian and Pearl
(2002); Shpitser and Pearl (2006)). Despite its com-
pleteness, however, the procedural solution is not
trivial, and we take here an alternative route to es-
tablish a simple and transparent procedure for con-
firming transportability, guided by two recognizable
subgoals.
Definition 6 (Trivial transportability). A caus-
al relation R is said to be trivially transportable from
Π to Π∗, if R(Π∗) is identifiable from (G∗, P ∗).
This criterion amounts to an ordinary test of iden-
tifiability of causal relations using graphs, as given
by Definition 2. It permits us to estimate R(Π∗) di-
rectly from observational studies on Π∗, unaided by
causal information from Π.
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Example 4. Let R be the causal effect P ∗(y|
do(x)) and let the selection diagram of Π and Π∗
be given by X → Y ← S, then R is trivially trans-
portable, since R(Π∗) = P ∗(y|x).
Another special case of transportability occurs
when a causal relation has identical form in both
domains—no recalibration is needed.
Definition 7 (Direct transportability). A causal
relation R is said to be directly transportable from
Π to Π∗, if R(Π∗) =R(Π).
A graphical test for direct transportability of R=
P ∗(y|do(x), z) follows from do-calculus and reads:
(S⊥ Y |X,Z)G
X
; in words, X blocks all paths from
S to Y once we remove all arrows pointing to X and
condition on Z. As a concrete example, this test is
satisfied in Figure 4(a) and, therefore, the z-specific
effects is the same in both populations; it is directly
transportable.
Remark. The notion of “external validity” as
defined by Manski (2007) (footnote 1) corresponds
to Direct Transportability, for it requires that R re-
tains its validity without adjustment, as in equation
(3.2). Such conditions preclude the use of informa-
tion from Π∗ to recalibrate R.
Example 5. Let R be the causal effect of X
on Y , and let D have a single S node pointing to
X , then R is directly transportable, because causal
effects are independent of the selection mechanism
(see Pearl (2009b), pages 72 and 73).
Example 6. Let R be the z-specific causal ef-
fect of X on Y P ∗(y|do(x), z) where Z is a set
of variables, and P and P ∗ differ only in the con-
ditional probabilities P (z|pa(Z)) and P ∗(z|pa(Z))
such that (Z⊥ Y |pa(Z)), as shown in Figure 4(b).
Under these conditions, R is not directly trans-
portable. However, the pa(Z)-specific causal effects
P ∗(y|do(x),pa(Z)) are directly transportable, and
so is P ∗(y|do(x)). Note that, due to the confound-
ing arcs, none of these quantities is identifiable.
5. TRANSPORTABILITY OF CAUSAL
EFFECTS—A GRAPHICAL CRITERION
We now state and prove two theorems that permit
us to decide algorithmically, given a selection dia-
gram, whether a relation is transportable between
two populations, and what the transport formula
should be.
Theorem 2. Let D be the selection diagram
characterizing two populations, Π and Π∗, and S
the set of selection variables in D. The strata-
specific causal effect P ∗(y|do(x), z) is transportable
from Π to Π∗ if Z d-separates Y from S in the
X-manipulated version of D, that is, Z satisfies
(Y ⊥ S|Z,X)D
X
.
Proof.
P ∗(y|do(x), z) = P (y|do(x), z, s∗).
From Rule 1 of do-calculus we have: P (y|do(x), z,
s∗) = P (y|do(x), z) whenever Z satisfies (Y ⊥ S|Z,
X) in D
X
. This proves Theorem 2. 
Definition 8 (S-admissibility). A set T of vari-
ables satisfying (Y ⊥ S|T,X) in D
X
will be called
S-admissible (with respect to the causal effect of
X on Y ).
Corollary 1. The average causal effect P ∗(y|
do(x)) is transportable from Π to Π∗ if there ex-
ists a set Z of observed pretreatment covariates that
is S-admissible. Moreover, the transport formula is
given by the weighting of equation (3.1).
Example 7. The causal effect is transportable
in Figure 4(a), since Z is S-admissible, and in Fig-
ure 4(b), where the empty set is S-admissible. It
is also transportable by the same criterion in Fig-
ure 5(b), where W is S-admissible, but not in Fig-
ure 5(a) where no S-admissible set exists.
Corollary 2. Any S variable that is point-
ing directly into X as in Figure 6(a), or that is d-
separated from Y in D
X
can be ignored.
This follows from the fact that the empty set is
S-admissible relative to any such S variable. Con-
ceptually, the corollary reflects the understanding
that differences in propensity to receive treatment
Fig. 5. Selection diagrams illustrating S-admissibility. (a)
Has no S-admissible set while in (b), W is S-admissible.
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Fig. 6. Selection diagrams illustrating transportability. The causal effect P (y|do(x)) is (trivially) transportable in (c) but
not in (b) and (f). It is transportable in (a), (d) and (e) (see Corollary 2).
do not hinder the transportability of treatment ef-
fects; the randomization used in the experimental
study washes away such differences.
We now generalize Theorem 2 to cases involving
treatment-dependent Z variables, as in Figure 4(c).
Theorem 3. The average causal effect P ∗(y|
do(x)) is transportable from Π to Π∗ if either one
of the following conditions holds:
1. P ∗(y|do(x)) is trivially transportable.
2. There exists a set of covariates, Z (possibly af-
fected by X) such that Z is S-admissible and for
which P ∗(z|do(x)) is transportable.
3. There exists a set of covariates, W that satisfy
(X⊥ Y |W )D
X(W )
and for which P ∗(w|do(x)) is
transportable.
Proof. 1. Condition 1 entails transportability.
2. If condition 2 holds, it implies
P ∗(y|do(x))
(5.1)
= P (y|do(x), s)
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z, s)P (z|do(x), s)(5.2)
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)P ∗(z|do(x)).(5.3)
We now note that the transportability of P (z|do(x))
should reduce P ∗(z|do(x)) to a star-free expression
and would render P ∗(y|do(x)) transportable.
3. If condition 3 holds, it implies
P ∗(y|do(x))
(5.4)
= P (y|do(x), s)
=
∑
w
P (y|do(x),w, s)P (w|do(x), s)(5.5)
=
∑
w
P (y|w,s)P ∗(w|do(x))(5.6)
(by Rule 3 of do-calculus)
=
∑
w
P ∗(y|w)P ∗(w|do(x)).(5.7)
We similarly note that the transportability of P ∗(w|
do(x)) should reduce P (w|do(x), s) to a star-free
expression and would render P ∗(y|do(x)) trans-
portable. This proves Theorem 3. 
Example 8. To illustrate the application of
Theorem 3, let us apply it to Figure 4(c), which
corresponds to the surrogate endpoint problem dis-
cussed in Section 3 (Example 3). Our goal is to
estimate P ∗(y|do(x))—the effect of X on Y in
the new population created by changes in how
Z responds to X . The structure of the problem
permits us to satisfy condition 2 of Theorem 3,
since Z is S-admissible and P ∗(z|do(x)) is triv-
ially transportable. The former can be seen from
(S⊥ Y |X,Z)G
X
, hence P ∗(y|do(x), z) = P (y|do(x),
z)); the latter can be seen from the fact that X and
Z and unconfounded, hence P ∗(z|do(x)) = P ∗(z|x).
Putting the two together, we get
P ∗(y|do(x)) =
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)P ∗(z|x),(5.8)
which proves equation (3.4).
Remark. The test entailed by Theorem 3 is re-
cursive, since the transportability of one causal ef-
fect depends on that of another. However, given
that the diagram is finite and acyclic, the sets Z
and W needed in conditions 2 and 3 of Theorem 3
would become closer and closer to X , and the it-
erative process will terminate after a finite num-
ber of steps. This occurs because the causal ef-
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fects P ∗(z|do(x)) (likewise, P ∗(w|do(x))) is triv-
ially transportable and equals P (z) for any Z node
that is not a descendant of X . Thus, the need for re-
iteration applies only to those members of Z that lie
on the causal pathways from X to Y . Note further
that the analyst need not terminate the procedure
upon satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3. If one
wishes to reduce the number of experiments, it can
continue until no further reduction is feasible.
Example 9. Figure 6(d) requires that we invoke
both conditions of Theorem 3, iteratively. To satisfy
condition 2, we note that Z is S-admissible, and we
need to prove the transportability of P ∗(z|do(x)).
To do that, we invoke condition 3 and note that W
d-separates X from Z in D. There remains to con-
firm the transportability of P ∗(w|do(x)), but this
is guaranteed by the fact that the empty set is
S-admissible relative to W , since (W⊥ S). Hence,
by Theorem 2 (replacing Y with W ) P ∗(w|do(x))
is transportable, which bestows transportability on
P ∗(y|do(x)). Thus, the final transport formula (de-
rived formally in the Appendix) is:
P ∗(y|do(x))
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)(5.9)
·
∑
w
P (w|do(x))P ∗(z|w).
The first two factors of the expression are estimable
in the experimental study, and the third through ob-
servational studies on the target population. Note
that the joint effect P (y,w, z|do(x)) need not be es-
timated in the experiment; a decomposition that re-
sults in decrease of measurement cost and sampling
variability.
A similar analysis proves the transportability of
the causal effect in Figure 6(e) (see Pearl and
Bareinboim (2011)). The model of Figure 6(f), how-
ever, does not allow for the transportability of
P ∗(y|do(x)) as witnessed by the absence of S-
admissible set in the diagram, and the inapplica-
bility of condition 3 of Theorem 3.
Example 10. To illustrate the power of The-
orem 3 in discerning transportability and deriving
transport formulae, Figure 7 represents a more intri-
cate selection diagram, which requires several itera-
tion to discern transportability. The transport for-
mula for this diagram is given by (derived formally
Fig. 7. Selection diagram in which the causal effect is shown
to be transportable in multiple iterations of Theorem 3 (see the
Appendix).
in the Appendix):
P ∗(y|do(x))
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)(5.10)
·
∑
w
P ∗(z|w)
∑
t
P (w|do(x), t)P ∗(t).
The main power of this formula is to guide in-
vestigators in deciding what measurements need be
taken in both the experimental study and the target
population. It asserts, for example, that variables U
and V need not be measured. It likewise asserts that
the W -specific causal effects need not be estimated
in the experimental study and only the conditional
probabilities P ∗(z|w) and P ∗(t) need be estimated
in the target population. The derivation of this for-
mulae is given in the Appendix.
Despite its power, Theorem 3 in not complete,
namely, it is not guaranteed to approve all trans-
portable relations or to disapprove all nontrans-
portable ones. An example of the former is contrived
in Bareinboim and Pearl (2012), where an alter-
native, necessary and sufficient condition is estab-
lished in both graphical and algorithmic form. The-
orem 3 provides, nevertheless, a simple and powerful
method of establishing transportability in practice.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Given judgements of how target populations may
differ from those under study, the paper offers a for-
mal representational language for making these as-
sessments precise and for deciding whether causal
relations in the target population can be inferred
from those obtained in an experimental study. When
such inference is possible, the criteria provided by
Theorems 2 and 3 yield transport formulae, namely,
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principled ways of calibrating the transported re-
lations so as to properly account for differences in
the populations. These transport formulae enable
the investigator to select the essential measurements
in both the experimental and observational studies,
and thus minimize measurement costs and sample
variability.
The inferences licensed by Theorem 2 and 3 repre-
sent worst case analysis, since we have assumed, in
the tradition of nonparametric modeling, that every
variable may potentially be an effect-modifier (or
moderator). If one is willing to assume that certain
relationships are noninteractive, or monotonic as is
the case in additive models, then additional trans-
port licenses may be issued, beyond those sanctioned
by Theorems 2 and 3.
While the results of this paper concern the trans-
fer of causal information from experimental to ob-
servational studies, the method can also benefit
in transporting statistical findings from one obser-
vational study to another (Pearl and Bareinboim
(2011)). The rationale for such transfer is two-fold.
First, information from the first study may enable
researchers to avoid repeated measurement of cer-
tain variables in the target population. Second, by
pooling data from both populations, we increase
the precision in which their commonalities are esti-
mated and, indirectly, also increase the precision by
which the target relationship is transported. Sub-
stantial reduction in sampling variability can be
thus achieved through this decomposition (Pearl
(2012b)).
Clearly, the same data-sharing philosophy can be
used to guide Meta-Analysis (Glass (1976); Hedges
and Olkin (1985); Rosenthal (1995); Owen (2009)),
where one attempts to combine results from many
experimental and observational studies, each con-
ducted on a different population and under a differ-
ent set of conditions, so as to construct an aggregate
measure of effect size that is “better,” in some for-
mal sense, than any one study in isolation. While
traditional approaches aims to average out differ-
ences between studies, our theory exploits the com-
monalities among the populations studied and the
target population. By pooling together commonali-
ties and discarding areas of disparity, we gain max-
imum use of the available samples (Bareinboim and
Pearl (2013c)).
To be of immediate use, our method relies on the
assumption that the analyst is in possession of suf-
ficient background knowledge to determine, at least
qualitatively, where two populations may differ from
one another. This knowledge is not vastly different
from that required in any principled approach to
causation in observational studies, since judgement
about possible effects of omitted factors is crucial
in any such analysis. Whereas such knowledge may
only be partially available, the analysis presented in
this paper is nevertheless essential for understand-
ing what knowledge is needed for the task to succeed
and how sensitive conclusions are to knowledge that
we do not possess.
Real-life situations will be marred, of course, with
additional complications that were not addressed
directly in this paper; for example, measurement
errors, selection bias, finite sample variability, un-
certainty about the graph structure and the pos-
sible existence of unmeasured confounders between
any two nodes in the diagram. Such issues are not
unique to transportability; they plague any problem
in causal analysis, regardless of whether they are
represented formally or ignored by avoiding formal-
ism. The methods offered in this paper are represen-
tative of what theory permits us to do in ideal situa-
tions, and the graphical representation presented in
this paper makes the assumptions explicit and trans-
parent. Transparency is essential for reaching tenta-
tive consensus among researchers and for facilitating
discussions to distinguish that which is deemed plau-
sible and important from that which is negligible or
implausible.
Finally, it is important to mention two recent
extensions of the results reported in this article.
Bareinboim and Pearl (2013a) have addressed the
problem of transportability in cases where only
a limited set of experiments can be conducted
at the source environment. Subsequently, the re-
sults were generalized to the problem of “meta-
transportability,” that is, pooling experimental re-
sults from multiple and disparate sources to syn-
thesize a consistent estimate of a causal relation at
yet another environment, potentially different from
each of the former (Bareinboim and Pearl (2013c)).
It is shown that such synthesis may be feasible from
multiple sources even in cases where it is not feasible
from any one source in isolation.
APPENDIX
Derivation of the transport formula for the causal
effect in the model of Figure 6(d) [equation (5.9)]:
P ∗(y|do(x))
= P (y|do(x), s)
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=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), s, z)P (z|do(x), s)
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)P (z|do(x), s)
(2nd condition of Theorem 3,
S-admissibility of Z of CE(X,Y ))
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)
·
∑
w
P (z|do(x),w, s)P (w|do(x), s)
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)
·
∑
w
P (z|w,s)P (w|do(x), s)(A.1)
(3rd condition of Theorem 3,
(X⊥ Z|W,S)D
X(W )
)
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)
·
∑
w
P (z|w,s)P (w|do(x))
(2nd condition of Theorem 3,
S-admissibility of the
empty set {} of CE(X,W ))
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)
·
∑
w
P ∗(z|w)P (w|do(x)).
Derivation of the transport formula for the causal
effect in the model of Figure 7 [equation (5.10)]:
P ∗(y|do(x))
= P (y|do(x), s, s′)
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), s, s′, z)P (z|do(x), s, s′)
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)P (z|do(x), s, s′)
(2nd condition of Theorem 3,
S-admissibility of Z of CE(X,Z))
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)
·
∑
w
P (z|do(x), s, s′,w)P (w|do(x), s, s′)
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)
·
∑
w
P (z|s, s′,w)P (w|do(x), s, s′)
(3rd condition of Theorem 3,
(X⊥ Z|W,S,S′)
D
X(W )
)
(A.2)
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)
∑
w
P (z|s, s′,w)
·
∑
t
P (w|do(x), s, s′, t)P (t|do(x), s, s′)
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)
∑
w
P (z|s, s′,w)
·
∑
t
P (w|do(x), t)P (t|do(x), s, s′)
(2nd condition of Theorem 3,
S-admissibility of T on CE(X,W ))
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)
∑
w
P (z|s, s′,w)
·
∑
t
P (w|do(x), t)P (t|s, s′)
(1st condition of Theorem 3/
Rule 3 of do-calculus, (X⊥ T |S,S′)
D
)
=
∑
z
P (y|do(x), z)
∑
w
P ∗(z|w)
·
∑
t
P (w|do(x), t)P ∗(t).
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